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Abstract
In bioethics vaccine refusal is often discussed as an instance of free riding on the herd immunity of an infectious disease. 
However, the social science of vaccine refusal suggests that the reasoning behind refusal to vaccinate more often stems 
from previous negative experiences in healthcare practice as well as deeply felt distrust of healthcare institutions. Moreover, 
vaccine refusal often acts like an exit mechanism. Whilst free riding is often met with sanctions, exit, according to Albert 
Hirschman’s theory of exit and voice is most efficiently met by addressing concerns and increasing the quality and number 
of feedback channels. If the legitimate grievances responsible for vaccine refusal are not heard or addressed by healthcare 
policy, further polarization of attitudes to vaccines is likely to ensue. Thus, there is a need in the bioethics of vaccine refusal to 
understand the diverse ethical questions of this inflammable issue in addition to those of individual responsibility to vaccinate.
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Introduction
Vaccine refusal in bioethics is often perceived as a ‘collec-
tive action problem’ in which individual citizens are free 
riding on the herd immunity of others (e.g., Giublini 2020; 
Savulescu 2021; Browne 2016). According to Gareth Cul-
lity (1995), free riding is a situation in which agents opti-
mize their own interest by not paying for the public goods 
they consume. Free riding is deemed to be wrong because 
it includes objectionably preferential treatment of oneself 
over others.
Bioethical discussion on vaccine refusal has centered on 
questions of individual obligation to vaccinate. At the same 
time there is a growing need to address vaccine refusal in 
health care policy in the most effective way. When facing 
the COVID-19 crisis, vaccination programs need to be able 
to address all citizens. For example, between one third and 
one fifth of American adults plan to refuse a COVID-19 vac-
cine (Motta 2021) even though herd immunity to Covid-19 
requires vaccine coverage of above 80%. It is currently an 
open question which policies are the most effective in influ-
encing vaccine refusers (e.g., Dubé et al. 2015).
This article calls for a change of perspectives to the bio-
ethics discussion on vaccine refusal. I argue that treating 
vaccine refusal as an instances of free riding, even though it 
brings out ethically central aspects about them, does not nec-
essarily lead to effective interventions. This is because vac-
cine refusal is rarely consciously intended to be an instance 
of free riding on herd immunity; instead, it may mirror an 
attempt to exit a public good instead of free riding on one. 
If it is seen as exit mechanisms of a kind, vaccine refusal is 
better met by listening to the actual grievances of patients in 
healthcare thus preventing further polarization of attitudes 
about vaccines. Considering the social science of vaccine 
refusal demands that bioethicists look at this complex socio-
political issue from a more diverse point of view than that 
of an individual obligation not to free ride. For instance, 
the injustices marginalized groups encounter in healthcare 
practice may explain motivations to refuse vaccines and in 
order to effectively manage them, factors leading to distrust 
should be addressed instead of only ascribing blame of free 
riding on herd immunity to individuals who do not experi-
ence the healthcare system as their own.
In the first part of the paper, I will show that based 
on empirical research on the reasoning behind vaccine 
refusal, free riding on herd immunity does not arise as a 
significant explanation of the motivations for this complex  * Kaisa Kärki 
 kaisa.karki@helsinki.fi




phenomenon.1 Then, I will demonstrate the usefulness of 
Hirschman’s theory of exit and voice for understanding 
the inflamed relationship between citizens and healthcare 
institutions in vaccine refusal. In the third part, I will show 
how both the exit approach and the social science of vaccine 
refusal leads to similar findings about how to effectively 
solve this issue. These findings emphasize respectful dis-
cussion with vaccine-hesitant patients instead of immedi-
ately ascribing blame to those who refuse to be vaccinated 
or display hesitancy about a vaccine. The concluding sec-
tions bring the discussion back to the change of perspec-
tives needed in bioethics due to the urgency of tackling vac-
cine hesitancy. The World Health Organization had already 
flagged this as one of the ten most urgent threats to global 
health (WHO 2019) in 2019 before the Covid-19 crisis.
Multiple grievances
Vaccine refusers are not a homogenous group (e.g., Asveld 
2008). In their extensive review on research on the reasons 
for vaccine refusal, Yaqub et al. found that only one out of 
38 articles cited conscious free riding as a reason for refus-
ing vaccines (Yaqub et al. 2014). Conscious free riding on 
the herd immunity of others is only one rationale for vaccine 
refusal (Asveld 2008: 247). According to the current social 
science of vaccine refusal, its rationale partly stems from 
various grievances in healthcare practice.
Public worries about the safety and efficacy of vaccines 
explain part of vaccine refusal but others stem from other 
issues and perceived injustices in healthcare practice (Navin 
2013). For instance, the sexist attitudes of physicians toward 
mothers and hostile responses of healthcare personnel to 
patient enquiries concerning vaccines arise from the empiri-
cal literature as reasons for vaccine refusal. Navin found 
that vaccine refusers have often been treated disrespectfully 
by physicians (2013: 247). Parents who refused vaccination 
for their children reported that pediatricians did not listen to 
them and did not offer adequate explanations on the safety 
and efficacy of vaccines, whereas the anti-vaccine figures 
were perceived as actually listening to the parents.
Ethnographical research on vaccine refusal suggests a 
similar line of reasoning. Poltorak et al. (2005) found that 
previous medical experiences with medical personnel influ-
enced trust in vaccine recommendations. Helps et al. (2019) 
found that dismissive encounters with health professionals 
were significant factors behind vaccine refusal. Perceived 
dismissal of parental concerns caused distress and under-
mined trust to medical establishment (Helps et al. 2019: 5). 
Nurmi & Salmenniemi (2019) found that vaccine-hesitant 
parents had often experienced aggressive conduct in health-
care. For instance, they had been called “child killers” as 
a response to merely asking whether a vaccine was safe 
(Nurmi & Salmenniemi 2019: 66). In general, interactions 
with healthcare providers have been found to be the key in 
understanding how vaccine hesitancy emerges (Dubé et al. 
2015: 4201).
Distrust of COVID-19 vaccines has been found to be most 
prevalent among individuals from ethnic minority groups, 
with lower annual income and of female gender (Paul et al. 
2021; Callaghan et al. 2021). Ward et al. found that vaccine 
refusal is more prevalent among the poor and marginalized 
groups perhaps because they are more at risk of encoun-
tering difficult interactions with institutions or because of 
feeling completely abandoned by them (Ward et al. 2020). 
Perceived injustices in healthcare practice may explain why 
women, the poor and the marginalized are in danger of los-
ing their trust in the medical establishment.
Vaccine refusal may also stem from distrust of the politi-
cal establishment of the whole country, for instance, as hap-
pened in the case in the Nigerian boycott of polio vaccina-
tion (Larson et al. 2011). Yaqub et al. found that lack of 
public trust was a more cited reason for vaccine hesitancy 
than lack of knowledge (Yaqub et al. 2014: 3). Yaqub et al. 
found that, in general, healthcare workers are experiencing 
an increasing number of problems in gaining the trust of 
their patients (2014). This mistrust was found to be targeted 
at healthcare institutions—not only particular vaccines. In 
the Netherlands, for instance, the government was believed 
to be the target of extensive lobbying by vaccine-producing 
companies (Yaqub et al. 2014). In France, distance from 
the political system correlated with negative attitudes to 
COVID-19 vaccines (Ward et al. 2020). Those who felt close 
to radical parties, felt distance toward all parties, and did not 
vote during the last election were significantly more likely 
to refuse vaccines (Ward et al. 2020: 2).
Of course, it is possible that due to the social stigma, 
vaccine refusers are listing other motivations than free rid-
ing when asked. If one is to free ride on the herd immunity 
1 It must be noted that free riding on herd immunity may explain why 
vaccine refusal is wrong regardless of whether an agent consciously 
intends to free ride on herd immunity. In some cases, when herd 
immunity is not being formed, citizens are not adequately informed 
about the vaccine program, and when vaccine refusers try to convince 
others not to vaccinate, the moral analysis of vaccine refusal from 
the perspective of free riding, may also fail. However, here I argue 
that the emphasis on treating vaccine refusal as an instance of free 
riding on herd immunity, even though it does provide a useful moral 
analysis of the phenomenon, frames the question in a way that may 
limit other central ethical questions, should not be taken as an analy-
sis of the motivations for vaccine refusal, is counterproductive at the 
healthcare practice, and may lead to ineffective interventions. Treat-
ing vaccine refusal as an exit mechanism not only explains its diverse 
motivations, but also brings different ethical questions to the fore, and 
provides better resources for addressing it than the kind of approaches 
that focus only on individual responsibility not to free ride. I must 
thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing these distinctions.
Listening to vaccine refusers 
1 3
of others, it would be rational to make sure, or at least not 
interfere with, others who are getting vaccinated (Dare 1998: 
144). Successful free riding is dependent on the complicity 
of others so that herd immunity is successfully formed in 
the first place. However, some vaccine refusers spread anti-
vaccination material, which would be irrational if they were 
trying to free ride on herd immunity. Sometimes vaccine 
refusal does not seem to altogether meet the criteria for suc-
cessful free riding on herd immunity.2
In conclusion, when enquiring about the motivations 
behind vaccine refusal, instead of consciously free riding 
on the herd immunity of others, the social science of vaccine 
refusal suggests that the reasoning behind vaccine refusal 
more often stems from previous negative experiences in 
healthcare practice as well as a deeply felt distrust toward 
healthcare institutions. Free riding motives are occasionally 
found in research on vaccine refusal, however, and it is pos-
sible that some vaccine-hesitant individuals are free riding 
consciously, because their decisions to postpone getting vac-
cinated may hinge on the complicity of others in taking the 
risk of potential side-effects on their own behalf.
Exiting a public good
In Hirschman’s theory of exit and voice, whether citizens 
express dissatisfaction through the open expression of dis-
sent, voice, or through the invisible mechanism of voting 
with their feet, exit, is dependent on the perceived features 
of an organization (Hirschman 1970). Exit is a situation in 
which the articulation of grievances is perceived to be some-
how not worthy of effort. Exit is taken “in the light of the 
prospects for the effective use of voice” (Hirschman 1970: 
37). Citizens who have lost trust in the public expression of 
dissent are more likely to prefer silent mechanisms of voting 
with their feet.
The social scientific literature on vaccine refusal points 
toward thinking of vaccine refusal as an exit mechanism of 
a kind. As discussed in the previous part, according to the 
current social science of vaccine refusal, its rationale often 
stems from various grievances in healthcare practice and as 
well as diminished trust to healthcare institutions. Accord-
ing to Navin, a mother who has faced epistemic injustices in 
healthcare may rationally resist her oppression by abandon-
ing this oppressive relationship and by creating “new forms 
of social life” (Navin 2013: 253). Nurmi and Salmenniemi 
recount that vaccine-refusing parents stopped talking about 
their choices to healthcare personnel after negative experi-
ences and the following lack of trust (Nurmi and Salmen-
niemi 2018). Helps et al. (2019, 4) found that vaccine refus-
ing parents ‘opted out’, not only of vaccination but of other 
Western values they perceived as problematic. Partisan 
membership and a lack of trust in public institutions arising 
from the Covid-19 vaccine hesitancy literature support the 
same conclusion. Vaccine refusers do not seem to find an 
established outlet for their frustrations in healthcare.
Hirschman reads both exit and voice as signs that the 
firm, state, or organization has deteriorating performance. 
However, public goods cannot be exited without exiting the 
whole community that provides them (Hirschman 1970: 
101). Hirschman defines public goods as “goods that are 
consumed by all the members of a community so that their 
consumption by one member does not detract from the con-
sumption of another” (Hirschman 1970: 101). He mentions 
crime prevention and national defense as prime examples of 
public goods but includes all such results of public policies 
that are enjoyed by everyone such as international prestige, 
advanced literacy, and public health (Hirschman 1970: 101). 
Public goods cannot be exited, because even if one were to 
opt out of a public school, one cannot exit from enjoying the 
benefits of the public school system as a whole. Public goods 
are shared, and they are all around us – it is impossible not to 
enjoy their benefits or not be bothered about their declining 
quality (Fennell 2001).
Herd immunity is usually seen as a public good in bioeth-
ics (e.g., Selgelid 2009; Dawson 2009). It includes a benefit 
that is shared by all members of a population and its benefit 
is disproportionate, meaning that while its benefit happens 
at the population level, the possible harm is borne by indi-
viduals. Even if one citizen were to oppose herd immunity 
to polio, only living in a society that provides this benefit 
would make the citizen enjoy the public good of herd immu-
nity to polio.
It is an interesting question whether public goods can be 
exited. Exit from supporting a public good, can be perceived 
at least. If non-compliance reaches a certain level, in the 
case of herd immunity, the consumption of the public good 
itself may itself be jeopardized. Vaccine refusal resembles 
an attempt to exit a public good, because a collective exit 
from herd immunity is conceivable even if one member can-
not exit it alone by refusing to vaccinate. In a democratic 
society, it is a matter of public debate whether something 
is considered to be a public good. If citizens have lost trust 
in the effectivity of public outcries, they may turn to more 
invisible forms of opposing policies.
Vaccine refusal read as an attempt to exit a public good 
is a signal that something else altogether is not functioning 
properly in the healthcare system. This can happen without 
major changes in healthcare services themselves – when the 
2 The moral analysis of vaccine refusal as free riding on herd immu-
nity may fail when the public good of herd immunity does not get 
formed, when the agent does not know about the vaccine program, 
when vaccine refusers are trying to convince others to not vaccinate, 
or when other necessary features of free riding on herd immunity as a 
public good are not met.
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role and expectations of how healthcare is arranged is chang-
ing rapidly.
Hirschman points out that people can react to a public 
good as if it were a private one (Hirschman 1970: 105). 
In a society dominated by private goods, such confusions 
can happen (Hirschman 1970: 105). In healthcare, treating a 
public good as if it was a private good may be connected to 
the postmodern perception of the patient as a consumer — 
making consumer-like choices in the healthcare setting (Kata 
2012). Kata has argued that the anti-vaccine movement takes 
advantage of this postmodern medical paradigm by framing 
the refusal to be vaccinated as part of the patient’s choice 
(Kata 2012: 3784). According to Kata, the Internet has 
increased the personalization of healthcare, transforming it 
into an arena of shared decision making between the patient 
and the professional (2012: 3779). The Internet seems to 
be only one change agent in this area.3 Yaqub et al. point 
out that the rhetoric emphasizing patient choice may partly 
explain the lack of trust in healthcare workers (2014: 7). 
This trend, they think, is part of a larger shift that focuses on 
the patient’s right to informed choice. Poltorak et al. (2005) 
also found that vaccine refusal is part of a wider change in 
how people relate to the state. According to their findings, 
the public health framing that emphasizes the role of public 
goods has little resonance with the current paradigm that 
now guides vaccine decisions (Poltorak et al. 2005: 717). 
Su et al. are already calling vaccine refusers “end users of 
health technologies” (2020).
Effective interventions
Another strength of applying Hirschman’s theory to under-
standing vaccine refusal in addition to explaining its motiva-
tions is that it can help in designing effective interventions 
for it. The plea for democratic decision making, the need 
for equal treatment of patients at healthcare practice and the 
growing lack of public trust in the medical establishment all 
point toward different interventions than framing vaccine 
refusal only from the perspective of individual responsibil-
ity to vaccinate.
Exit is a sign that communication between citizens 
and the state is not functioning properly. According to 
Hirschman, institutions that do not wish to encourage the 
exit option should provide as many effective channels for 
articulation of criticism as possible. Then, the inevitable 
grievances stemming from actual quality failures could be 
addressed. Not only does the number of channels matter, 
but it is also important that the organization is responsive to 
the criticisms made (Hirschman 1970). Once the usefulness 
of the voice mechanism for maintaining good performance 
has been recognized, institutions can be designed in a way 
that reduces the cost of voice or rewards it (Hirschman 
1970: 42). In healthcare, reducing the cost of voice would 
mean increasing the number of reporting channels for 
offensive behavior by physicians and developing ways to 
increase democratic decision making between physicians 
and patients.
Major changes in ways in which medicine is practiced 
have been called for to counter vaccine refusal (Navin 2013: 
253). Getting rid of testimonial injustices, such as not hear-
ing out mothers talking about the health problems of their 
children, and epistemic vices, such as an authoritarian way 
of transferring information without explanation, are needed 
(Navin 2013: 254). If gender prejudices contribute to the 
disrespectful communication between pediatricians and 
mothers, increasing gender equality in healthcare practice 
would eventually reduce vaccine refusal.
According to public health communication studies, it 
has been deemed to be important to treat vaccine sceptics 
respectfully (Fahlquist 2018). A good starting point for a 
respectful discussion, according to Fahlquist, is taking the 
concerns of vaccine sceptics seriously, whatever they are, 
because their concerns may be valid. Increasing public trust 
in healthcare policies is most likely to happen by first inquir-
ing about the worries of the public and then using them 
as a starting point for discussion (Falhquist 2018). Helps 
et al. (2019, 2) also emphasize that media and policy mak-
ers should avoid framing vaccination from the polarizing 
perspective of pro and anti-vaccination, instead recognizing 
the diverse nature of vaccine decisions.
If vaccine refusal works like an exit mechanism, manda-
tory vaccinations may end up escalating the problem instead 
of solving it. Mandatory vaccine policy does not necessarily 
increase compliance (Dare 1998) but may increase distrust 
(Asveld 2008: 256). According to the social science of vac-
cine refusal, it should be approached with great care because 
the increased distrust in healthcare may outweigh its poten-
tial benefits (Dubé et al. 2015: 4200). Passive compliance 
has been seen as a feature of the past healthcare policy, as 
now there is a need for a policy in which people are actively 
involved and respected (Vernon 2003). This is partly because 
the Internet has changed vaccine communication from top-
down expert-consumer communication into non-hierarchical 
dialogue (Larson et al. 2011: 528). It has been found that 
vaccine refusers have a more democratic view of epistemic 
authority in medicine than medical authorities. Navin, espe-
cially, has argued that vaccine refusers are not necessarily 
irrational but often motivated by good epistemic practices 
such as a non-authoritarian relationship between doctors and 
patients (Navin 2013: 244).
Most importantly, approaching vaccine-hesitant patients 
with a more democratic approach undermines potential 3 Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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support for anti-vaccination movements (Navin 2013: 245). 
A shared decision-making model in healthcare can pre-
vent people’s receptivity to anti-vaccine arguments (Chen 
1999). Blume has argued that patient organizations are built 
on patient experiences in not having their grievances heard 
(Blume 2006: 637). Ostracized people are likely to share 
their grievances only with those who already share the same 
attitudes (Rogers & Pilgrim 1994). If the grievances are 
voiced only to those who already share the same attitudes, 
further polarization and distrust toward healthcare policy is 
likely to ensue. Callaghan et al. even point out that there is a 
pressing need to understand how racial injustices contribute 
to vaccine refusal, because anti-vaccine groups are framing 
vaccination in terms of past medical abuses against minority 
groups (2021: 2).
There is a need for more empirical study on the how to 
effectively counter vaccine refusal. Policymakers should not 
assume what the public wants but systematic approaches to 
listening public concerns should be developed (Larson et al. 
2011: 532). This is because interventions that are based on 
empirical data and situational assessment are deemed to be 
more likely to succeed (Dubé et al. 2015: 4201). Dubé et al. 
argue that understanding the specific concerns of vaccine-
hesitant individuals is necessary for designing effective strat-
egies to counteract it. Also, the best practices in gaining 
back public trust after negative experiences should be better 
known (Blume 2006). In effect, reasoning that is driving a 
diminishing trust in public institutions would need to be bet-
ter empirically understood (Larson et al. 2011).
How and whether people perceive herd immunity to be 
a public good would also need to be empirically studied 
(Skea et al., 2008). Then policymakers could address the 
public conceptions of herd immunity even if they were at 
odds with the medically accepted view (Skea et al. 2008). 
For instance, it has been found that some mothers perceive 
the obligation to vaccinate dependent on whether a child is 
especially vulnerable to the adverse effects of vaccines — 
whereas the official views emphasize equal responsibility to 
vaccinate (Skea et al. 2008).
In Hirschman’s theory, the dissatisfied are seen as a criti-
cal mass concerned with the quality of their social insti-
tutions and with a potential to change them for the better 
— if only their concerns were inquired, heard, and taken 
into consideration. The social science of vaccine refusal 
does not portray a picture of an irrational mass easily led 
by faulty argumentation that can only be brought back from 
hysteria by force (Rogers & Pilgrim 1994). The assumption 
that vaccine refusers were misinformed, and irrational has 
been deemed to be a sociologically inadequate explanation 
because this issue goes “to the heart of modern citizenship 
and democratic policies” (Blume 2006). Hirschman’s theory 
shows how people can experience alienation from the social 
system they inhabit instead of trying to strategically benefit 
from it. A lack of trust in health professionals is central in 
understanding vaccine refusal. A wide-spread reluctance to 
follow health officials’ suggestions may be a sign of exiting 
a public good, that is, as a collective non-acceptance of herd 
immunity as a public good.
Free riding versus exit
So far, it has been argued that free riding on herd immunity 
is not the only, nor necessarily always the best way in bio-
ethics to approach vaccine refusal. This is for the following 
reasons.
(1) Free riding on herd immunity is not a significant moti-
vating factor for vaccine refusal according to the social 
science studying the reasoning behind this phenom-
enon.
(2) Vaccine refusers often spread anti-vaccination material, 
which would be irrational if they were only trying to 
benefit from the herd immunity of others. Instead, it 
seems that at least in some cases, they genuinely do not 
share the reasoning behind public vaccine programs.
(3) In some cases, herd immunity has not been formed 
when people are refusing vaccines. There is no public 
good that the refusers could free ride on, nor does it 
necessarily get formed in the first place due to refusal. 
In these cases, and when (2) is met, the free riding 
interpretation might not be a viable way to go for-
ward with the moral analysis of vaccine refusal as an 
instance of free riding on herd immunity either.
(4) Interventions that social scientists suggest for vaccine 
refusal are not targeted to reduce the prevalence of free 
riding. Instead, social scientists promote utmost care 
in implementing mandatory policies because they may 
end up increasing distrust toward the healthcare system.
The exit mechanism was deemed to be an alternative way 
to approach vaccine refusal for the following reasons.
(1) Exit mechanism explain how the public good in ques-
tion does not get formed in the first place. This is 
because from a large enough exit from a public good, 
the whole existence of this good is called into question.
(2) Exit correlates with a lack of trust in institutions. This 
is precisely what the social scientific literature on vac-
cine refusal suggests as one of the most significant 
explanatory factors in this phenomenon.
(3) Exit correlates with the failure of traditional voice 
mechanisms such as voting. Social scientists have 
found partisan political preference and a lack of voting 
behavior to correlate with vaccine refusal.
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(4) Perceiving vaccine refusal as an exit mechanism cor-
relates with communication problems between an insti-
tution and its members. This is what healthcare com-
munication research suggests is key in understanding 
vaccine refusal and in designing effective interventions 
to counteract it.
(5) The interventions suggested by Hirschman are like 
those suggested by social scientists studying vaccine 
refusal: namely listening to the refusers and trying to 
address their legitimate grievances.
(6) Exit mechanisms explain the confusion of utilizing 
a traditionally market mechanism in the public arena 
which is also what has been deemed to be problematic 
by the social scientists in vaccine refusal.
Moreover, if bioethicists take free riding from herd immu-
nity as the starting point for the ethical discussion on vaccine 
refusal, several morally significant factors are not taken into 
consideration. Individual free riding is not the only ethically 
suspect behavior in place when large populations refuse 
vaccines. Exit mechanisms consider the whole interactive 
situation between the organization and the individual which 
leads to a wide array of relevant ethical questions that have 
not been discussed yet. Perceiving vaccine refusal as an exit 
mechanism of a kind raises ethical questions beyond indi-
vidual responsibility to vaccinate, such as: What is the role 
of healthcare institutions in making sure they do not alienate 
marginalized groups? What is the responsibility of an indi-
vidual physician who discriminates against patients belong-
ing to minority groups – to the extent that they become vac-
cine refusers?
Conclusion
It has been argued that in ethics and the social sciences, non-
normative concepts should be used when talking about what 
agents in society do not do (Kärki 2018). This is because 
it is difficult to discuss the normative status of an action 
or omission when the concepts used already invoke strong 
moral intuitions. Refusals in healthcare are multifaceted phe-
nomena that require empirical interest to be fully understood 
(Hickson 2010). If academics decide for healthcare workers 
what motivates their refusals, they end up oversimplifying 
the issue (Hickson 2010: 180). The same goes for vaccine 
refusal. Without understanding actual motivations behind 
vaccine refusal, even though it may be possible to determine 
its normative status, effective interventions cannot necessar-
ily be found. Even if free riding is a viable way to talk about 
vaccine refusal from the perspective of fairness, it should not 
be taken as an explanation of its motivation, nor as the start-
ing point for designing effective interventions on it. A view 
informed by the social science of vaccine refusal leads to 
different interventions than those arising from a purely nor-
mative treatment. In particular, strong ascriptions of blame 
can backfire in actual healthcare practice.
If vaccine refusal is perceived as an instance of free rid-
ing, it is often met with sanctions. If it is perceived as stem-
ming from lack of information, it follows that campaigns 
can reduce its prevalence. If it seen as an exit mechanism, 
addressing concerns and increasing the number and qual-
ity of feedback channels should reduce its prevalence. The 
social science of vaccine refusal implies consistently that 
respectful discussion among healthcare personnel and vac-
cine-hesitant individuals is key in reducing the prevalence 
of vaccine refusal.
How a problem is framed influences how and whether 
it can be solved. Refusals in general are difficult to read in 
healthcare practice. Bioethics can inform policy interven-
tions on vaccine refusal, but pure normative treatment is not 
enough to increase understanding of this complex socio-
political phenomenon that urgently needs to be tackled. A 
lack of neutral language for discussing a controversial issue 
may even hinder effective interventions by ascribing blame 
before understanding. To prevent further polarization, the 
various grievances of vaccine refusers need to be heard espe-
cially because some of them stem from legitimate worries 
and actual injustices experienced in healthcare practice.
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